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ME COURT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

Supreme Court Docket No.

38683-2011
KYLE ATHAY,
PlaintifflRespondent,

RICH COUNTY, UTAH.
DefendanllAppeliant.

MITCHELL W. BROWN, District Judge
Appealed from the District Court of th

SIXTH

Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for
BEAR LAKE
County.

CRAIG R. JORGENSEN,
Attorney for Plaintiff/Respondt'nl

ALAN JOHNSTON, PETER STJRBA
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant
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IN THE DISTRICT C01JRT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BEAR LAKE
KYLEATHAY,

)
)
) Supreme Court Docket No.38683-2011
) CASE NO. CV-2002-000072
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff-Respondent,

-vsRICH COlJNTY, UTAH,

Defendant-Appellant,
and
DALE M. STACY; CHAD L. LUDWIG;
GREGG ATHAY; BRENT R. BUNN;
BEAR LAKE COUNTY, IDAHO,
Defendants.

CLERK'S LIMITED RECORD ON APPEAL
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in and for
the County of Bear Lake.
HONORABLE MITCHELL W. BROWN
Sixth District Judge

CRAIG R. JORGENSEN
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 4904
Pocatello, ID 83205-4904
Counsel for PlaintifflRespondent

ALAN JOHNSTON
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 2949
Idaho Falls, ID 83403-2949
Resident Counsel for Defendant!Appellant

PETER STIRBA
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 810
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-0810
Non-Resident Counsel for Defendant/Appellant
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DIS TR leT COURT
SIXTH 'UDICIAL DISTRICT
!] E:, i;_ " ;. E co U~n Y. ID ,j H0

2009 NOV I 9 PH
1\

ALAN 10HN"STON (Idaho Bar No, 7709)

Y HADDOCK,

aEPUTy _ _ _ _ _ cASE NO.

E. W, PIKE & ASSOCIATES, P.A.

151 North Ridge Ave., Suite 210
P.O. Box 2949
Idaho Falls, ID 83403~2949

Telephone: (208) 528@6444
Telefax: (208) 528-6447
Bar
R BLAKE HAMILTON
STIRBA. & ,""",,,, I'...."..

11

215 South
P.O. Box 810
City, UT 84110~0810
Telephone: (801) 364~8300
Telefax: (801) 364-8355

IN

JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE
AND
Tru~ COUNTY

KYLEATHAY,
Plaintiff,

Case No.

v.

CV~02-00072

DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS AND SPECIAL
VERDiCT FORM

RICH COUNTY, UTAH,
Defendant.

LI'wlvHY"'"t,

proposed jury

Rich County,
"''''<AU.U''

by and through undersigned counsel,

pursuant to LR.C.P. 51. further, the Defendant requests

/0
1/

02

submits their

to offer

llll

/:::01)

1'BU

1

~:3

,,$

may, during

course

the case to the

on

"

form.

on

A

"'''U'I'''"'''' and principles of law:
verdict/jury's .responsibility;
2 ",,,r,u,,,"'''' (l r the court;

3

nrnUlnf',.

of the jury;

4 statements

0

rcounsel arc not

by counsel not to influence the

5

6 review

""''';'''11'''''

COl11Uleu to

in

courtroom;

II impeachment;

12 reaching a
13 llelec.:ting a foreman; and
14 communications with the court.

In

by the

to the

requests that

also

one

DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTiONS /\ND SPEClAL VERDICT FORM

2

11./1

100

,u,u,,,",,,,,u hereto.

to l.R.C.P. 51(a)(1), the originals contain a blank

numbering. See Attachment MB." The dupHci3.tes are numbered and contain
Attachrn.ent "c."

DATED this --"'---

tn'",,,,,,,,,,,,, 2009.

R. BLAKE
PETER STIRBA
AHomeys for Defendant

DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND SPEC1AL VERDICT FORM

J
j

for
See

H/l

~!

ZOO

THU lZt 32

24/0

OF SERVICE

r HEREBY CERTIFY that on th1s
day of November, 2009 I caused to be
a true copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM by the method indicated below, to the following:

Craig R. Jorgensen,
Attorney at Law
1246 Yellowstone Avenue, Suite A4

() U,S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
()~ghtMaH

P.O. Box 4904
Pocatello lD 83205·4904
Attorney for Plaintiff,:)

(1"Facsimile

Alan Johnston
W. PIKE &

( ) lJ.S. Mail,
( ) Hand Delivered
()
might

j

t 51 North Rldge
P.O. Box

Prepaid

Idaho Falls, 10
Defendants

()u. S. Mail,
( ) Hand Delivered
( ) ~fight Mail
(;)Facsimile

--1~~
/

DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND SPECIAL VERnICT FORM

I

13

4

11/1 /:0 0 0 ~

(

j

'f'fH)

12; 3

25/082

11

1 t/

/:,009

'fHO 12:

26/08

KYLEATHAY.
No. CV-02-00072

Plainti

SPECIAL

v.

RlCH COUNTY, UTAH,

jury, answer

questions

ff

NO. 1.

as

bmltte:d to us in

act with

Ii " ' ... iTrnli

while

conduct, if any, fa proxi (Illite Gause of

QUESTION NO.2.
plaintiff s injuries?
Yes
If you have

No
both

above questions "Yes," then please answer the next two
of the questiorL"l "No," you will not answer

questions, If Y01.1

UV'4L ....

cause

yw~'"

on the part of Daryl Ervin which was a

rem<'!lning

1/1 ,/

21/0

No

ANS\VER:

H'V~JUI5,VU'.V

r(\'\{11rt'\!JtT(.'

on

cause of the accident?

ANSWER:
of Kyle Athay

QUESTION NO.6.

cause
ANSWER: Yes

If you answered 'No! to
will next 311l!Wer

4,5

6, yOll should not answer

7, but

8.

a zero (0)

answer to

"
insert in

8

you

must total 100%.
to the cause of

1.

(b)

(c)
(d)

County Sheriff's
Ie Athay

2

VERDICT

J

11/19! :' 0 a

rHU 1 ,3

I' AX

1082

(e)

Chad Ludwig
(g) Wyoming Downs

100
8.

is the total amount of damages sllstained by Kylt:: Athay as a

FOREMAN

v

3

r1

11/L9/2009 7HU 1::;,

F'AX

13

1!

I 00~

~'[1 U 1

NO.
Plaintl ff Kyle Athay claims that Rich County} Utah, is liable for the damages the plaintlff
allegedly suffered as a result or a vehicle collision between Ky le Athay and Daryl Emn on June
10, 1999

Mr. Ervin was being pursued by Sheriff Stacey and Bear Lake County Deputies

Gregg Athay and Chad Ludwig.
In aelemiC, Rich County claims it is not liable because Sheriff Stacey
during the

incident and

not a proximate cause of plaintiffs alleged damages.

Sheriil'

with

11/l9! 0

:1'flO

3 lOS:'!

statement by me identifying a claim of a party is not evidence -in this case. I

advised you of the

of Llie parties merely to acquaint you

the issues to

lL/19

00

:l'BU

INSTRUCTION NO.
The plaintiff has
L

burden

proving

with

of the

disregard

2,

3,

4,

to

amount

LH",vUi,

11/1!i! ZO()9

3)

that

Gregg
were

and/or

the burden of proving each of the follovdng

1.

That the plaintiff, Daryl Ervin, Deputy Gregg Athay and/or Deputy Chad Ludwig

2.

That the negligence of plaintiff, Daryl Ervin, Deputy Gregg Athay and/or Deputy

Chad LudVJig was a proximate cause ofthe injury and damage claimed tD have been suffered by

In

tl

:5 /0

/

.mRY INSTRUCTION NO.

\\Then
you find" or
111le

r

that a party has the burden of proof on a propositio~ or use the expression "if
you decide," I mean you must be persuaded that the proposition is more probably

than not true.

11/1 .' 2009 2'[)U 1 ,34

35/082

When I use

II

proximate cause," I mean a canse

complained injury, loss or damage,

probable sequence,

damage would not have occurred. Tl need not

in
but

or
that cause Lhe

the only cause. It is sufficient if it is a

substantia! factor in bringing about the irdury, loss or damage. It is not a proximate cause if tbe
injury, loss or damage Hkely would have occurred anyway_

There
two or more

one or more proximate causes of an inj ury. When
contributes

as substantial factors in

cause

(

5

conduct

an injury,
the extent to

11/ 91:::00~ TflU 1

FhX

/0

.JURY INSTRUCTION

that

In

VU'c'H.u,,n~G

in

course

conduct.

/1 /2 O~

37/1)

I use

word

in these

I mean

care in the management of one's property or person. The words "ordinary care" mean
reasonably l::areful person would use under circumstances similar to those shown by

Negligence may thus
person would do, or

doing of something a reasonably careful person would 110t dQ, under
to those

careful

of the failure to do something which a reasonably careful

act

by

The law
is for

not say lio',,- a
to

11/U!2QO

THU

L

3

NO.

A violation of a statute is negligence, unless (1) compliance with the statute ',vas
impossible, or (2) something over which the party had no control placed him
violation of the statute, or (3) an emergency not ofthc: palty's own making
the statute or an excuse specifically provlded

In

within the statute existed

a pmaucm
him Lo fail to

11/1 /200

'reu 12135

:3 /0 :2

JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

The: statlltes of the state ofTdaho state that it is un1<l\wul for any person who i$ under the

influence of alcohol, drugs

OT

any other intoxicating substances to drive (IT

control of a motor vehicle within ihis !itate.

I

J

in actual

0/0 :'.

The statutes
"rn",rn .. n,'"

or police

state that upon

immediate

lIse of an audible or visible signal,

must yield the right-of-way and immediately drive to a
as possible to, the nearest

driver
paranel to, and as

or curb of the highway lawflll for parking and clear of any

intersection, and stop and remain in that position until the authorized emergency or police
vehicle has P""''''"'''', except when otherwise directed by a peace officer.

other

11/ 9!

loEl

JURY

statutes

NO.

stale ofIdaho state that no person shall drive amotor vehicle at such a

as to impede the nomlaJ

slow

is

reasonable movement

or

traft1c

law.

3

1/

I

0~

42/0

NO.

A

is under the influence of [an intoxicating

beveragel [using a drug], the dnver'i; physical or

when, as a

that the driver no longer has the capacity to drive a

mental abilities are impaired to the

vehicle with the caution

a sober person of ordinary prudence

circumstances.
Liquor is an U"'~'.n.l'V"""""- ''''U'~I>''Y''

31
{

S

[a

similar

1 '1!

/ :l QC

'CH U

INSTRUCTION
statutes

due

sta1e of Idaho state that every driver of a vehicle

care to avoid colliding with any

or ,In)' person propelling a hllrnan~powered verJcle

an
upon

rHY',~rVl11,O

any

or

or any

3

person,

IQ :::

11/19/2009

NO.

The statues
to willfully

signal to bring

the state ofIdaho state that it is unlawful for the driver

or attempt to elude a pursuing police vehicle when given a

vchlc1e to a stop,

a motor vehicle
or audible

1l/19!~Oi')9

F

/082

INSTRUCTION NO.

The statutes of the state of Idaho state that
pursuit of an actual or suspected violator olthe law, may (a) proceed past a red or stop signal
stop sign, but only after

down as may be necessary for safe operation,

maximum speed limits so long as he does not endanger life or property.

(b)

Or

11/1 I

009 TflU 1

46/0

INSTRUCTION NO.

The statutes

state of Idaho state that every person

drive at a

appropriate speed when approaching and crossing au intersection, when

o.trrr'rl\'41'Ylino

around a curve.• when approaching a hillcrest, when lraveling llpon any narrow or
highway, and when special

of weather or

/

conditions.

exist with respect to pedestrians or other

or

reason

1 /1

~

/

0 0 ~ 'rB U 1

36

{

7/0

1/1

/

0

'THU

8/0

NO.

An

witness is witness who has

knowledge

a particular matter and

give his opinion on that matter. In determining the weight to be given such opinion, you should
the qualifications

are not

(n

credibility of the witness and the reasons given for his opinion.
Give it the weight, if any, to which

31

it entitled,

Hit I

00

'l'fjU 1

7

9/082

FAX

JURY INSTRUCTION NO.
evidence is about to be presented to you by
taken under oath

is testimony

the ""tr,.."" t-iand.

this testimony in open court. Although there is a record of

testimony you are about to hear, this

•
S

A

the trial and preserved in writing. This evidence is entitled to the same

had the UI1T1'f"'''' testified

You will only

u".~'vcHL1V'

will 1101 be available to you during your deliberations.

11 i L9 ,I ~ 0 9 'rH U 1

7

'50/08

JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

A person who

a condition, pain, or disability at the time of an injury is not entitled to

recover damages

However, he is "Ln.",,,,," to recover uaLUU/~v'" for any

or

"ITOTfiv'»,

the

If you find
was

or

then if your

plaintiff you

ofthe condition or

proximately due to such aggravation,

is in
pam or

you should not consider any condition, pain, or

disability which may have

prior to the occurrence, or from which the plaintiff may now

be suffering which was not

or contributed to by reason or this occurrence.

You are to apportion, if possible, between the oondllion, pain, or disability prior to this
occurrence and the condition, pain, or disability caused by this occurrence, and assess liability

accordingly. Ifno apportionment can reasonably be made by you,
the

(

S

the defendants are Hable

1 1! 19 i

009

Tn u

~05

A

prevent further

must
rbrn<lC,'"

Any

ordinary care to

results from a failure to

care cannot

IOBZ

11/1

I 009

L'lSTRUCTION NO.
of qu~stions which you

In this cuse; you will return special verdict consisting of a

should answer. There are individual questions about the recklessness and negligence or lack of
eC1(lcs:mei~8

and

Athay, Sheriff Dala:

Daryl

Deputy

Athayand Deputy Chad Ludwig and other specific questions about the runmmt of damages. Tn
,","'''-''TOTIO

each

you must

answers is more probably true than not true. Since the

your

which you will have are
"",JAW." . .

persuaded, considering all the evidence in the case, that

to you, 1 will

of

on the form

the verdict

to you

it. It ~tarts:

"We, the jury, answer

questions submitted to us in the special verdict as follows:

QUESTION NO. 1. Did

act with reckless disregard

Mr.

ANSWER: Yes

conduct, if

QUESTION NO.

[fyou have

both of the

answer

'N 0;

Thus, you will

that if you should find

next two

will not answer

there was reckless conduct on the part of

I

/

a ~JH.'Auun'.1w cause

11/1/200

1 ,

/0 :'.

will

was a

you bave a verdict But if you find that there was
the

was a FL V"UL""" cause of the accident,

you

conduct on
on. The

verdict fom1 continues:
11

QUESTION NO, 4.

negligence on the part of Dary 1Ervin which was a proximate

ANSWER: Yes

5,

of Kyle

cause

on

4, 5 and 6, you should not answer

If you answered 'No'

IUe:5LlC'TI

No, 7,

will next answer Question No.8."
are now to COlnp,are the fault

"UYDU
the appropriate

pa.rties,

to any of the preceding questions, then insert a zero (0) in
in Question

insert in the appropriate lillt:~

answer to

7. If you answered any of the "",1'("'f'i",(1rn,(r questions
fulSwer to Question No.7

j1/19/

O()~

54/08

1'fW 1

Il

The

to

7.

(b)

oause

in

Dale

%

(c) Bear Lake County Sheriff's

Cd) Kyle Athay
Athay

(e)

-_%

(t)
(g)

U'XI'{'\WI,,,n

TOTAL 100 %"
The verdict fann

IIIf

yOll from

this point It

percentage of c;;;msation for the plaintiff is equal to or greater than the

to the
percentage

",,,,,,,,,>UL;VU

attributed

then you will not answer Question No.8, but will sign 1he verdict If the
causation attributed to the plaintiff is less than the percentage () f fault attributed to

defendant, then you will answer Question No.8."

Question

8 is your .... ~.L\dHU1Hk"V of the total amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff.

11/19/ 00

'l'flU 1

is

"QUESTION NO.8.

amount of damages sustained by the plaintiff

as a result of the accident?
~'\NSWER: ~ _ _~__."

You should include in your answer to Question No.6 the total amount of all monetary (la11t1El!1;eS
which you find

the evidence was sustained by the plaintiff.
"ordict.

11/19.' 009 ~'BU 12,

I ,'v

I

1 1 ! 1 l:l 009 Ttl u

NO.
Plaintiff

Athay

allegedly suffered as a result

that Rich County, Utah, is liable for the

Athay and Chad Ludwig.
it is not

not

See Complaint and Rich County Defendant's Answer. generally.
GIVEN
REFUSED

-~------

MODIFIED _ _- -

COVERED _ - - -

OTHER

the

!>L~~AW.LL

a vehicle collision between Kyle Athay and Daryl Erv111 on June

10) 1999 while Mr. Ervin was being pursued by Sheriff Stacey and Bear

In

YUHW.".""

Deputies

11/l9/ 00

T!lU 1

:)

B/O

me

you of the

IDJI1.05
GIVEN ___-~--__

of the

a

a

is not "'V1nP","'"

merely to acquaint YDU with

to be

11/1/00

/08

INSTRUCTION NO.
The plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following propositions:
L

Sheriff

2.

That plaintiff was

3.

That Sheriff Stacets recklessness was a proximate cause of injury

with reckless disregard toward the
AUjLW... " ,

damaged;

plaintiff; and,
4.

1

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED

COVERED
OTHER

The elements

1

damage, and the amount thereof.

11/1

1200~

TD!] 1:2::3

FH

60/08

lNSTRUCTION NO.

In this case defendants have asserted the affirnmti.... e defense
Daryl Ervin, Bear Lake County Deputy Gregg Athay and/or Bear Lake County

Ludwig were negligent Defendant
1.

burden of proving each of the following propositions:

That the plaintiffl Daryl Ervin, Deputy Gregg Athay and/or Deputy Chad Ludwig

was negligent;
2.

That the negligence of plaintiff, Daryl Ervin, Deputy Gregg A1hay and/or Deputy

Chad Ludwig was 11 proximate cause of the injury and damage claimed to have been suffered by
the plaintiff.

GIVEN _ -___~~
REFtJSED _ _ __

MODIFIED _ _~_

COVERED
OTHER _ _ _ __

1 L!1 /2009 'I'BlJ 12, H

F"\L

NO.

1 say
or

true

you

not true.

IDJll.20.1
GIVEN

REFUSED _ _~_

MODIFIED
COllENED _ _ __

OrnER

proof on a proposition, or us.;;

a
.1

I

must

is more

11/19/2CO~

'rHU 1

When I use

expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause

,
In

or

p1'Obabie sequence, produced the complained injury, loss or damage, and but for that cause the
damag:e would not have occurred. It need not be the only cause. It is sufficient if it is a

substantial factor in bringing about the inj ury, loss or darnage. It is not a !J~VAiH1Cl.L'" cause if the
injury, loss or damage likely would have occurred anyway,

There may

one or more proximate causes of an injury. MIen the negligent conduct of

two or more persons

concurrently as substantial

bringing about an

the condLlct of each may be a proximate cause of the injury regardless of the extent
contributes to the injury.

IDJI

1

GIVEN _ _ _ __

MODIFIED _~~~_~
OTHER

which

lL/i

I

O~

~'fJU

3/0 :':

12dO

NO.

A person aCTS "recklessly" or with

UIlreasonsbJe risk of bodily
probability

harm ~111 result

aiJz:l!,c. § 6-901 et

GIVEN
REFUSED _ _- -

MODIFIED _ _ _~

v~,v"';:,

disregard" if the

and the person actually

creates

the high degree

c,(IT1tinues in his course of conduct.

as adopted by Arhay v. Siact!y, 146 Idaho 407 (2008)

1

LI L~ I

0 (\ ~ 'f H U 1?: 4, 0

I" l'LX

NO,

When I use the word "negligencell in these instructions. I meM the failure to use ordinary
care in

management

ouels property or person, The words llordinary ct'J'e" mean the care a

reasonably careful person would use under circumstances similar to those shovYn by the
evidence. Negligence may thus consist of
person

do, or

30methlng a reasonably
to
act

IOIl 2.20
GIVEN_~

__

REFUSED _ _ _~
MODIFIED _ _ _~
COVERED _ _~_
OTHER~

__

failure to

something which a
person would not do, under
not say
is for you to

11/19/2009

12:

A

/08

(1) COmplilh'1Ce vvith

statute is

statute was

party had no control placed him in a positiOft of
or (3) an

violation

"'""",.."" not of the party's own making

statute or an eXC~3e specifically

IDJI 2.22 (as modified)
GIVEN _ _ _~_

REFUSED
MODIFIED _ _ __
COVERED_~

for within the statute existed.

him to fail to

11/19/ 00

1'flU 1

JURY lNSTRUCTION NO.

~

The statutes of the state ofldaho state thar it is unlawful for any person who is under the

influence 0 f alcohol, drugs or any other intoxicating substances to drive or be in actual physical
control of Ii motor vehicle within this state.

I.e.

§ 18-8004-

GIVEN _ _~_~

MODIFIED ~_~___
COVERED _ _- - OTHER_~~_ _

1

/1 'Jj / ;:: 0 g TEl U 1

41

INSTRUCTION NO,

~

The statutes of the state ofIdaho state that upon the immediate approach of an "".1"",.,.,,'1,,11

or police vehicle making use of an audible or visible signal, the driver of every other
vehicle must yield the

and immediatelY drive to a position parallel to,

as dose

as possible to, the nearest edge or curb of the highway lawful fer parking and clear of any
intersection, and stop

remain in

vehicle has

when Dtherwise

I.e. § 49~625
GIVEN

REFUSED _ _ __
MODIFIED ~~_ _

COVERED
OTHER

position until
""·I·"~ •. 1'1

authorized emergency or police

by a peace officer.

11119/00

TICJU12,

68/0 "

INSTRlJCTION NO, .

statutes of

state

\'2-_

state that no person shall drive a motor
and rensonable movement of traffic

or in

I.e. §
GIVEN_~_ __

REFUSED

MODIFrED _ _~__
COVERED ___~__
OTHER_~

at

a

1l/L9/2009 TAU 12:41

A person

I

EI

motor

is

the influence of [an

[a

drug] when, as a result of [drinking an intoxicating beverage] [using a dmg], the
mental abilities are impaired to Lhe degree that

driver no longer

the capacity to

or
a

vehicle with the caution characteristic of a sober person of ordinary prudence acting under similar

Liquor is an intoxicating

lDJI 2.22.2

MODIFIED _____

COVERED ____~

Z

11/191001

70,'0

INSTRUCTION
The statutes otthe state OfIdtiho state that every driver\of a vehicle shall exercise due
care to avoid colllding with any pec,estJ:1an or any person propelling a human-powered vehicJe
and shaH

an audible

necessary. Every driver shall

upon observing any child or any obviously confused, incapacitated or intoxicated person.

I.e. §

15

GIVEN _ _ _~_
REFUSED ~_ __

MODIFIED _ _ __
COVERED _ _ _~

OTHER _ _ __

11/19/200' THU 1

t

11/08

JURy INSTRUCTION NO.

Is;

The statues of the state of Idaho state that it is unla'Wful for the driver of a motor vehicle
to willfully flee or attempt to elude a pursuing police vehicle when given a visual or audibJe
signal to bring the vehicle to a stop_

1.e. § 49"1404
GIVEN
REFUSED _ _ __

MODIFIED _ _
COVERED ~__~
OTHER_~_~_

In

1/1 /

009 l'HU 1

in

state

statutes

for
so long as

IDJl

or

law, may (a) proceed past a red or

or suspected violator

life or ~"",,,,~ ..+"h,

not

modified)

See':' g/so I.e. § 49-623

GIVEN
REFUSED _ _
MODIFIED ~_ __
COVERED _ _

OTHER ___~~___

!oj

(b)

1 1/ 1 i

009

/0 Z

Til U L

NO,

The statutes of the state of Idaho state that every person shall

at a

and

appropriate speed when approaching and crossing an intersection, when approaching and going

around a curve, when approaching a hillcrest, when traveling upon any mlITQW or winding
highway, and when special hazards exist with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason
of weather or hlghway cDnditions.

REFUSED _ _~
MODIFIED _ _~_COVERED _ _ ~_ _
OTHER

11/1~/200li

l'flU 1~1

2

4/0

NO.~
The statutes of the
the roadway.

I.e. § 49-630

GIVEN
REFUSED _ _ __
MODrFIED _ _~_
COVERED ~_ __
OTHER_~_~_~

of Idaho state that a vehicle

11/1$11 009 2'ElIJ 12:

INSTRUCTION NO.

An

'X!'1n .... "c

J.:L

is a witness who has special knowledge in a particular matter and may

give his opinion on that matter. Tn determining the weight 10 be given such opinion, you should
consider the qualifications and credibility of the witness end the reasons given
are not bound by

GIVEN
REFUSED _ _ __
MODIFIED
COVERED _ __

OTHER _ _ _ _ __

opinion.

it th.: weight, if any, to which you deem it

opinion.

1 1! 1 ~ /

009 TfHJ t 21

i

P""'"""")eL"''''

oath

the trial

preserved

to you by deposition. A
writing. This evidence is

to

same

consideration you would give had the witness testified from the witness stand,

You will only receive this testimony in open court, Although there is a record of the
testimony you arc about to hear, this record will not be available to you du..tfug your deliberations.

IDJI I
G1VEN _ _ _ _~

REFUSED _~_~~

OTHER _ _ __

I\)S

ll!L ,I 00

7/

JURY INSTRUCTION NO,
A

who

a condition, pain, or disability at the time of an injury is not entitled to

recover \.tCLI,!!"!,,","' therefore. However, he is

to recover damages for any aggravation of

pain, or disability proximately resulting from

injury.

If you find that before this occurrence the plaintiff had a preexisting bodily
which was

WUUWU,'l"

'VVLLun,vu

pain or disability, and further find that because ofthis occurrence

condition 01' the pain or the disability was aggravated, then if your verdict is in

plaintifr you should consider the aggravation of the condition or the
proximately due to such
disability which may

or

but you should not consider any condition,

or

existed prior to the occurrence~ or from which the plaintiff may now

be suffering which was not caused or contributed to by reason of this occurrence.

You are to apportion, if possible, "",r",.""" the conditioll, pain, or disability plioI,' to
oocurrence and the condition,

Ifno

9.02
GIVEN

REFUSED

MODIFIED
COVERED _ _ __
OTHER

or disability caused by this occurrence, and assess liability
can reasonably

by

the ,,,,,,,,,,,,'''',,,, are liable

11/19/

OO~

cr'BU 1

3

78/082

INSTRUCTION NO, ~~
A person
prevent further damage.

damaged must
loss that results from a failure to exercise such care cannot be

lDJ19,

GIVEN _______
MODIFIED~_

COVERED

OTHER

~-~

l1

1I.!L!i/:Z009 THU 1~143

NO.
In this case you will return a special verdict consisting of a
should answer.

of

are individual questions about the recklessness 8Jld
Daryl
Ludwig and
"lU'~""V'"

you must be persuaded, considering an the evidence in

choice of answers is more probably true than not true. Since the

\'1hich yOtl

In

questions about the amount

have are

of my instructions to you, I will

the veJdict

case, t.~at
on the
to

explain it. It StiLr1:S:
"We, the jury, answer the questions submitted to us
QUESTION NO. 1. Did Sheriff
ANSWER:

i.e"'!

the special verdict us follows:

act with reckless disregard while pursuing Mr. Ervin?

No

QUESTION NO.2. Was Sheriff Sracey',s reckless conduct, if any, a proximate cause of
plaintiff's

ANSWER: Yes

No

Jfyou have answered both of the a.bove questions 'Yes,' then please answer the next hvo
questions. If you have answered either ofthe questions 'No,' you wilt not EmSwer the remaining
questions, but will simply
GIVEN
REFUSED~_ __

MODIFIED _~_
COVERED _ _~

OTHER

verdict"

lLlll OO~ TtlU12lj

FAX

that

if yon

you

s piLrt which was a

on

cause of the accident, then you will

and imonn the bailiff that yot!

But if you find that

verdict

was

on

the Sheriff Stacey's patt which was a proximate cause of the accident, then you go on. The
verdict form continues:
"QUESTION NO, 4. Was there ne~U1gen(;e on the part of Daryl Ervin which was a proxh:nate

cause of the accident?
ANS'V1ER: Yes

No

NO.S.

there

U)i;'-HVV

on the part of Kylc Athay whkh WElS a proximate

cause of the accident?

No

which was

vrULHH,"

ANSWER: Yes

deputies

ofBe8l' Lake County

QUESTlONNO.6.Was

cause of the accident?
No

If you answered 'No' to Questions Nos. 4, 5 a1l.q 6, you should not answer

llIP:~nrlT't

No.7, but

will next answer Question No.8."
You are now to compare the
answered

REFUSED~

to atlY

__

MODIFIED ~___~_
COVERED ___ -._~
OTHER _ _

I

j

I

of

parties.

the preceding questions, then

Ii

zero (0)

answer to

1

in Question No.7. IfYOll answered any of the preceding questions 'Yes/
insert in the appropriate line in the answer to Question No.7 the percentage of fault you find
attribumble to that party. Your percentages must total 100%."

The fann continues:
"QUESTION NO.7. We find

contributed to the cause of the accident in

following

ea) Daryl Ervin
(b) Sheriff Dale
(c) Bear Lake County Sheriffs Deputies
(d) Kyle Athay
(e)

%

Athay

(t)

Wyorning

TOTAL 100 %"
itself

this

Jt

plaintiff is equal to or greater than

causation attributed

to the defend,mt, then you will not answer Question No.3, but will slgn the verdict. If the

percentage of causation attributed to
GIVEN _ _ _ __
REFUSED~_~

MODIFmD ----

COVERED _~___
OTHER __ ~._~_.

pJaintiff i3 less than the percentage offault attributed to

f '"

11/ 1 /:; 0 0

TH a

j

,

defendant, then you will answer Question No. g."
Question No.8 is your deterrninatJon of the total umount of damages

by

This questLOn asks you:
"QUEStION NO.8. What is the total amount of damages sustained by the

"
6 the

you

lO.n 1 1 (as modified)
GIVEN _ _ _ _ _
REFUSED . ._~._ _
MODIFIED

COVERED

OTHER ..

---

--~-~-

...-

11

amount

aU

Kyle Athay

COLI
~JUCIC

COlJ
• ( BEAR LAKE COUNTY IDAHO

Iva v c20 dcftJ g
J

DATE

3.: (5' f) fJi'-

TI ME
CLERK

990) .
Attorney At Law
920 E. Clark
P.O. Box 4904
Pocatello, Tdaho
Telephone: (208)
Facsimile: (208)
Attorney for Plaintiff

NO,
\

THE

.mDICIAL
OF

OF

FOR

KYLEATHAY,

)
)

Plaintiff,

)

CASE NO. CV-02-00072

)

vs.

)
)

RICH COUNTY,wUTAH,
A political subdivision of the State of Utah;

NO\V,

)
)
)

PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED
INSTRUCTIONS AND SPECIAL
VERDICT FOR~1

Plaintiff and hereby submits and

court

the jury the

following instructions, No. 1-_ _
Plaintiff anticipates and further requests the court give its usual "stock instructions".
SUBMITTED this _ _ day of November, 2009.

Plaintiff's

I

- PAGE 1

NO.
to
case.

is

the

instructions to those

and in

the law set

to

in

way to decide the case. Your decision should be based

upon a rational and objective assessment of the evidence. It should not be based on
sympathy or prejudice.

It is my duty to iustruct you on the points oflaw necessary to decide the case, and it
is your duty to follow the law as I
not picking out one
given or the manner

You must consider these instructions as a whole,

disregarding others. The
which they are numbered has no significance as to the importance

of any of them. If you do not understand an instruction, you may send a note to me through
the Bailiff, and I will try to
In

the

This evidence consists

or explain the point further.
you may consider only the evidence

of

aUUUL","U

of the 'witnesses, the exhibits admitted into evidence,

and any stipulated or admitted facts. While the arguments
may help you understand the evidence and

of

is not

the instructions,

evidence. If an attorney's argument or

in the

no

attorneys

<"Tl,non

disregard
eourt is
I

by

of

or

without

to an offered

it into evidence. My

are solely my

must not speculate as to

which was

reason

thereon, and in reaching your decision, you

such a question or

In

or speculate as to what the answer or exhibit would have shown.

Remember, a question is not evidence and should be considered only as it

meaning to

answer.
were

an objection was made

an answer
the answer or

remark was made, and in my ruling on the objection, I
remark

or

stricken, or directed that you disregard the answer or remark and dismiss it

from your minds. In your deliberations, you must not consider such answer or remark, but
must treat it as though

never heard it.

law does not require you to believe all of the evidence
the

As the sole judges

what weight you attach to it.

the facts, you must determine what
so doing, you bring with you to

There is no

evaluating testimony.

are
case.

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER

Pin

I

5

ln1>.rrO.N

in the course of
yon believe and
of

your

INSTRUCTION NO. _ _

When I

a

has the burden of proof on a

expression "if you find" or "if you
proposition is more

GIVEN

REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER

Plrrtfj

It

I mean you must be

true than not true.

or use the

NO.
use
course of

IDJ2.20
Athay v. Stacey 142

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER

Pin

897 at 902

INSTRUCTION NO.

When I use the ""vord "negligence"
ordinary care in the
mean

care a

to use

these instructions, I mean

of one's property or person. The words "ordinary care"
would use under

nii_~ .. ·.....

u." . . .''''''

"'JUHJlUU

to

shown by the evidence. Negligence may thus consist of the failure to do something which a
reasonably careful person would do, or the doing of something a reasonably careful person
would not do, under circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence. The law does
not

how a reasonably

person would act under those

you to decide.

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER

,

.s

71

..n,""",,,, That is for

INSTRUCTION NO.

has

proof on each

the following nr'ODI[)SlnOn

1.

That the Defendant committed reckless disregard for the safety

2.

That the Defendant's reckless disregard was a

of
cause

of the Plaintiff's injuries.

3.
If you

propositions

That the Plaintiff has suffered damages.
from your consideration of aU the evidence that each of these
been

r. ...'VUD.,..

your verdict should

Plaintiff. If you
not

your

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER

P/n+f

should

INSTRUCTION NO.

On the Defendant's

negligence against

1.
negligence was a

be

cause of

on tIle jury

\Vas there negligence on tIle part of the Plaintiff Kyle Athay , which was a
proximate cause of Plaintiff's
If you fmd from your consideration of aU the evidence that each of these

propositions has been proved, then you should answer this question "Yes. II

you

from your consideration of all tIle evidence that any of these propositions

not been

you

answer

"No. "

GIVEN

REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER

71

NO.

When I use

expression" proximate cause," I mean a cause that,

natural or

probable sequence, produced the injury, and/or the loss or the damage complained of. It
need not be the only cause. It is sufficient if it is a substantial factor in bringing about
injury, loss or damage. It is not a proximate cause if the injury, loss or damage likely would
occurred
There may be one or more proximate causes of an injury. When the negligent
conduct of two or more

r"",."r..... c

or

contributes concurrently as

in bringing about an injury, the conduct of each may be a proximate cause of
regardless of

extent to which each contributes to the

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER

Pin

Instr-

INSTRUCTION NO.
you
as to

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER

U'-'U'UU0

is

on the subject of damages, I do not nvn.... "'''

INSTRUCTION NO.
is entitled to recover
must determine the amount of
Plaintiff

that will reasonably and

compensate the

damages proved to be proximately caused by the

The elements
A.

acts.

damage the jury may consider are:

N on-economic damages

1.

nature of

rrnn¥1lr

of abilities to perform usual
hythe

5.

caused to any

B.
value of necessary medical care .'o.<'onT<>n
incurred as a result of the injury,

the present cash value of medical care and expenses

reasonably certain and necessary to be required in the future;
The reasonable value of the past earnings lost as a
The present cash value of the future earning capacity
the injury,

into

of the injury;
because of

the earning power, age,

and physical abilities, habits, and disposition of the Plaintiff, and any other circumstances
shown by the evidence.
The reasonable value of necessary services provided by
doing things

the Plaintiff which, except for the injury, the

have performed, and the
required

the future;

value of

pr'TH"~"

would ordinarily

reasonably

to be

'Vhether

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER

Plaintiff

proved any of these elements is for the jury to

INSTRUCTION NO.

of the questions

was

you to determine is whether or not Sheriff

acting 'within the scope of his authority.
An agent within the scope of his authority is he is engaged in the transaction of
business.which has

assigned to him by his principal, or if he is doing anything which

reasonably be said to have been contemplated as a part of his employment.
necessary that an act or failure to act must haye been expressly authorized

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER

is not

Rich County.

at a given time

One is

he is

au'mCjr~~ea

to act for, or

the place of, such other person. The term "agent" includes servants and employees; and
the term "p:rincipal"
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Therefore, any performance done by

is

case.
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as evidence
only to help you understand the
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case, but is
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the premises involved in this case. What you observed
should consider your view of the premises
applying the evidence produced here in trial.

INSTRUCTION NO.

In this case, you will be given a Special Verdict Form to use in returning your
verdict. This form consists of a series of questions that you are to answer. I will read the
verdict form to you now.
"We, the Jury, answer the questions submitted to us in the Special Verdict as
follows:
"QUESTION NO. 1. Was there reckless disregard for the safety of others on the
part of the Defendant Sheriff Dale Stacey, which was the proximate cause of the accident"?
Answer:

Yes _ _ No.

If you answered the above question "Yes", then please answer Questions No. 2and 3.
If you answered the above question "No", then simply sign the verdict form and inform the

Bailiff that you are done.
The verdict form continues.
"QUESTION NO.2. Was there negligence on the part ofthe Daryl Ervin which
was the proximate cause of the accident"?
"QUESTION NO.2. Was there negligence on the part ofthe Plaintiff Kyle Athay
which was the proximate cause of the accident"?
Answer:

Yes

No.

If you answered "No" to Questions No. 2and 3, then you will not answer Question

No.4, but will next answer Question No.5.
If you answered "Yes" to both prior questions, then answer Question No.4.

QUESTION NO.4: We find that the parties contributed to the cause of the accident
in the following percentages:

9/1

(a)

The Plaintiff Kyle Athay

(b)

The Defendant Dale Stacey

(c)

Daryl J. Ervin

- - -%
TOTAL

100%

The verdict form itself guides you from this point. It says:
"If the percentage of negligence for the Plaintiff is 50% or more, then you will not

answer any further questions, but will sign the verdict".
"If the percentage of negligence for the Plaintiff is less than 50%, you will answer

Question No.4".
QUESTION NO.4 is your determination of the total amount of damages sustained
by the Plaintiff. This question asks you:
"QUESTION NO.4: "'hat is the total amount of damages sustained by the Plaintiff
Kyle Athay as a result of the accident"? Answer:
You should include in your answer to Question No.4 the total amount of all
monetary damages which you find from the evidence was sustained by the Plaintiff.
Finally, you should sign the verdict form as explained in another instruction.
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INSTRUCTION NO.
On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a Foreman, who will
preside over your deliberations.
Appropriate forms of verdict will be submitted to you "rith any instructions. Use
only the ones conforming to your conclusions and return the others unused.
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. If your
verdict is unanimous, your Foreman alone will sign it; but if nine or more, but less than the
entire jury agree, then those so agreeing will sign the verdict.
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdict, you will notify the Bailiff,
who will then return you into open court.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BEAR LAKE

KYLEATHAY,

)
)

Plaintiff,

)
)

vs.

)
)

RICH COUNTY, UTAH,
A political subdivision of the State of Utah;

)
)

CASE NO. CV-02-00072

SPECIAL VERDICT

)

Defendants.
WE THE JURY, answer the questions submitted to us in the special verdict as follows:
"QUESTION NO.1: Did the Defendant Sheriff Dale Stacey commit reckless disregard of
the rights of others, which was a proximate cause of the accident?"
Answer: Yes

No - -

If you answered question 1 "Yes," then please answer Questions No.2 and 3. If you
answered questions 1 ''No'' then simply sign the verdict form and inform the Bailiff that you
are done.
If you answered Question No.1 "Yes", please answer Question 2 and 3.Ifyou answered
the above question "No", then simply sign the verdict form and inform the Baillifthat you are
done.
Special Verdict -

PAGE

1

"QUESTION NO.2: Was there comparative responsibility on the part of Daryl Ervin
which was a proximate cause of the accident?"
No

Answer: Yes

"QUESTION NO.3: Was there comparative responsibility on the part of Kyle Athay
which was a proximate cause of the accident?" Answer: Yes _ _ No _ _ .
If you answered ''No'' to Questions 2 and 3, then you will not answer Question No.4, but
will answer Question No.5.
If you answered "Yes" to both prior Questions, then answer Question No.4.
You are now to compare the responsibility of the parties. Insert in the answer to Question
No.4, the percentage of comparative responsibility you find attributable to each party. Your
percentages must total 100%.
"QUESTION NO.4: We find that the parties contributed to the cause of the accident in
the following percentages:
(a)

The Defendant Dale Stacey

%

(b)

Daryl J. Ervin

%

(d)

The Plaintiff Kyle Athay
TOTAL

- -%
100%

The verdict form itself guides you from this point. It says:

Special Verdict -

PAGE 2
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"If the percentage of comparative responsibility for the Plaintiff is 50% or more, then you

will not answer any further questions, but will sign the verdict."
"If the percentage of comparative responsibility for the Plaintiff is less than 50% you will
answer Question No.5.
Question No 5 is your determination ofthe total amount of damages sustained by the
Plaintiff. This question asks you:
"QUESTION NO.5: What is the total amount of damages sustained by the PlaintiffKyie
Athay as a result of the accident?" Answer:
You should include in your answer to Question No.5 the total amount of all monetary
damages which you find from the evidence, was sustained by the Plaintiff.
Finally, you should sign the verdict form as explained in another instruction.
DATED this ._ _ day of December, 2009

FOREMAN

Special Verdict -
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P.O, Box 2949
Idaho Falls, ID U.J.v",,-,
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PETER STIRBA (Utah Bar No. 3118)
R. BLAKE HAMILTON (Utah Bar No. 11395)
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES
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215 South State Street, Suite '750
P.O. Box 810
Salt Lake City, UT 84110-0810

Telephone: (801) 364-8300
Telefax: (80 1) 364-8355
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Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BEAR LAKE

KYLEATHAY>

Plaintiff,

v.

Case No. CV-02-000n
DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS AND SPECIAL

RICH COUNTY, DTAH.

VERDICT FORM

Defendant.

Defendant Rich County. Utah, by and through undersigned counsel, hereby submits its
proposed jury instructions pursuant to I.RC.P. 51. Further, the Defendant requests leave 10 offer
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such other and additional instructions as may, during the course of the trial, become appropriate.
Defendant also requests that the Court submit the case to the jury on the attached special verdict
form. See Attachment I'A."

A.

Defendant requests that the Court give stock instructions on the following

subjects and principles of law:

S.

1.

yerdict/juty's responsibility;

2.

province of the Court;

3.

province of the jury;

4.

statements and arguments of counsel are not evidence;

5.

objections by counsel not to influence the jUJY;

6.

review of evidence confined to evidence received in the courtroom;

7.

direct and circumstantial evidence;

8.

weight of the evidence;

9.

jurfS recollection controls;

10.

credibility of witnesses;

11.

impeachment;

12.

reaching a verdict;

13.

selecting a foteman; and,

14.

communications with the Court

In addition to the above, Defendant requests that the following instructions also

be given b;y the CoUJt. One original and Qne copy of Defendant's proposed instructions have
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been attached hereto. Pursuant to LRC.P. 51(a)(l), the originals contain a blank space for
,!Umbering. See Attachment "B." The duplicates are numbered and contain citations. See
Attachment "c."
OATEtJ this

L~

day ofJune, 2010.
STIRBA & ASSOCIATES

By:

R. BLAKE HAMIL TON

PBTER STIRBA
Attorneys for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

Z+-

day of June, 2010 I caused to be served a true

copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT'S P:ROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM by the method indicated below, to the following:
Craig R JorgenseIl; Esq.
Attorney at Law
1246 Yellowstone Avenue, Suite A4
P.O. Box 4904
Pocatello, ID 83205~4904

() U.S. Mail. Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
()O~htMai1

~simile

Attorney for Plaintiffs
Alan 10hnston
E. W. PIKE & ASSOCIATES, P.A.

() U.S, Mail, Postage Prepaid

151 NorthRidge Ave., Suite 210
P.O. Box 2949
Idaho Falls, lD 83403-2949
Attorney for Defendants

()O~htMail
(~c8imile

( ) Hand Delivered

Honorable Mitchell W, Brown

( ) US. Mail, Postage Prepaid

District Judge - Resident Chambers
P.O, Box 775
Soda Springs, Idaho 83276

( ) Hand Delivered
() Ov . tMail
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

Plaintiff Kyle Athay claims that Rich County, Utah, is liable for the damages the Plaintiff
allegedly suffered as a result of a vehicle collision between Kyle Athay and Daryl Ervin on June
10, 1999, while Mr. Ervin was being pursued by Sheriff Stacey and Bear Lake County Deputies
Gregg Athay and Chad Ludwig.

In defense, Rich County claims it is not liable because Sheriff Stacey acted with the
appropriate level of care during the relevant incident and because Sheriff Stacey' 8 conduct was
not a proximate cause of Plaintiff's alleged damages. Defendant further claims that the incident
was caused solely or partially by the negligence of Daryl Ervin. Gregg Athay, Chad Ludwig,
Bear Lake County, Kyle Athay. and Wyoming Downs,
Additionally; Rich County claims that if Sheriff Stacey's conduct is found to be reckless,
this conduct falls outside the scope of Stacey's employment with Rich County and thus Rich
County cannot be held liable for any injuries prO)(imately caused by Stacey's recklessness.
This instruction is not intended to be a statement of facts nor what the evidence in this
case has shown, but rather it is me-.rely a summary by the Court of the respective claims made by
the parties in this case.
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A PROFESSTC)l-lAL LAW CORPORAnON

215 SOUTH STATE STREttT. SUITE 750
POST OFFICE BOX 810
SAlT LAJ(): CITY. UTAH 84110·0810
TELEPHONE, 80 l· 364-8300
FAX
fACSlMILe: 801.3ti4·iU55
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TRANSMISSION SHEET

To:
Clerk of the Court
Bear Lake County Courthouse

Fax No.:
(208) 945-2780

Honorable Mitchell W. Brown
Resident Chambers

(208) 547-4759

Craig R. Jorgensen
Attorney at Law

(208) 237-1706

Alan JaMston

(208)528·6447

RW. Pike & Assoclates

Fro:m;

R. Blake Hamilton
Stirba & Associates

Subject:

Athay v. Rich CQunty - Case No, CV-02-000n

Date:
4P~ 29 2010
No, of Pages;
. ~ including cover sheei
j
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JURy INSTRUCTION NO.
The burden ofproofis upon a party making a claim to establish its claim by a
preponderance of the evidence.

By "burden of proof" it is meant the obligation resting on the party o:r parties who assert a
proposition 'to establish the same by a preponderance of the evidence presented in this case,
regardless of which party may have produced such evidence.

By "preponderance of the evidence" is meant that evidence which is most convincing and
satisfying in the controversy between the parties. regardless of which party may have produced
such evidence. It means the greater weight of the evidence, or that the evidence has a greater
probability oftmth when compared to the evidence opposed to it.
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

The TIlles of evidence ordinarily do not pelmit the opinion of a witness to be received as
evidetl.ce. An exception to this rule exists in the case of expert witnesses. A person who, by

education, study and exp:<ri<:nco, has become an expert in an art, science or profession, and who
is called as a witness, may give his opinion as to any such matter in which he is versed and
whk~h

is material to the case you should consider such expert opinion and should weight the

reasOlLS, if any, given for it. You are not bound, however, by such an opinion, Give it the weight

which you deem it entitled, whether that be great or slight, and you may reject it, if in your
judgment the reasons given for it are unsound.
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JORY INSTRUCTION NO.

It is your duty to hear and determine this case the same as if it were between individuals,
The fact that the Plaintiff is an individual and the Defendant is a cotmty in the State, of Utah
should make no difference whatsoever to you. You should return a true and just verdict
according to the facts and the law as I give it to you, without reference to the county or
individual character of any party.
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

You will note that the person whose conduct we set up as a standard is not the
extraordinarily cautious individual, nor the exceptionally skillful one. but a person of reasonable
and ordinary prudence. 'While exceptional caution and skill are to be admired and encouraged,
the law does not demand them as a general standard of conduct.
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JURy INSTRUCTION NO.

Negligence is the failure to do what a reasonable and prudent person would have done
under the circumstances) or doing what such person under such circumstances wou.ld not have
done. 1ne fault may lie in acting Or in omitting to act.
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JURYrNSTRUCTION NO.
A person acts "recklessly" or with "reckless disregard" if the person's conduct creates an
unreasonable risk of bodily harm, and the person actually perceives the high degree of
probability that harm will result and continues in his course of conduct.
Actual knowledge of the high degree of probability that harm will result does not require
knowledge of the actual person or persons at risk. or the exact manner in which they would be
harmed, It only requires knowledge of the high degree of probability of the kind of harm that the
injured party suffered.
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J1JRYINSTRUCTION NO.

When I use the expression "proximate cause, I mean a cause which, in natural or
II

probable sequence, produced the complained injury, loss or damage, and but for that cause the
damage would not have occurred. It need not be the only causo. It is sufficient if it is a
substantial factor in bringing about the injuryl loss or dama.ge, It is not a proximate cause if the

injUlY, loss or damage likely would have occurred anyway.
There may be one or more proximate causes of an injury. When the negligent eonduct of
two or more persons contributes concurrently as substantial factors in bringing about an injury,
the conduct of each may be a proximate cause of the injury regardless of the extent to which each
contributes to the injury,
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JURYlNSTRUCTION NO.
In order to recover on his claim against Defendant. the Plaintiff must establish the
following elements in order to recover:
First: That Sheriff Stacey acted with reckless disregard toward the safety of others,
SecQnd: That Sheriff Stacey's recklessness was a proximate cause of injuty and damage
to Plaint~ and
Third: That Sheriff Stacey's conduct is imputable to Rich County.

If you find that the Plaintiff has established each of the following by a preponderance of
the evidence, your ve1'dict will be for the Plaintiff. Otherwise, you verdict will be for the
Defendam.
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nJRY INSTRUCTION NO.

The Defendant claims that Daryl Ervin, was negligent and that his negligence solely or
putially proximately cause the accident and Plaintiff's injuries. Defendant claims Daryl Ervin
was negligent in that he failed to use due care in:
(a)

Driving when he knew or should have known he was intoxicated; and/or

(b)

Fleeing a Police Officer; and/or;

(c)

Keeping his vehicle under reasonably safe and propet control; and!or

(d)

FaiHng to drive at such a speed as was safe, reasonable and prudent under

the circumstances. having due regaI'd to the width, surface, curvature and condition of the
highwciy; the traffic thereon, the visibility, and any actual or potential hazards then
,

<:;xistil1g.
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JURY INS TRUCTION NO.
In this case the law requires that you determine whether the negligence of any other party
cO,ltributed to the accident as a proximate cause. Bear Lake County Deputies Gregg Athay and
Chad Ludwig> the other officers involved in the pursuit, Kyle Athay, and/or the Wyoming
Downs are all parties whose conduct may have oontributed to the accident.
You will address the issue of the possible negligence of each of the above parties as you
answer the special verdict form.
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

1 he statutes of the State of Idaho state that the driver of a police vehlc.1e. when in the
pursuit of an actual or suspected violator of the law, may (a) proceed past a red or stop signal or
stop sign, but only after slowing down as may be necessary for safe operation~ (b) exceed the
maximum speed limits so long as he does not endanger life or property, and (0) disregard

tegulations governing direction of movement or turning in specified directions.
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JURy lNS TRDCTION NO.

A violation of a statute is negligence, unless (1) compliance with the statute was
impossible. or (2) something over which the party had 110 conn:ol placed him in a position of
violation oftlte statute" or (3) an emergency not of the partyts own making caused him to fail to
obey the statute Or an excuse specifically provided for within the statute existed
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JURY INS TRUCTION NO.

In the State ofIdaho it is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of alcohol,
drugs or any other intoxicating substances to drive or be in actual physical control of a motor
vehicle within this state. The evidence in this case is that Daryl Ervin had a blood alcohol level
of .13 or .11, which is above the legal limit.
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JURlllNSTRUCTION NO.
It is a felony in the State of Idaho for the driver of a motor vehicle to willfully flee or
attempt to elude a pursuing police vehicle when given a visual or audible signal to bring the

vehicle to a stop_
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JURYINSTRlJCTION NO.

The statutes ofthe State of Idaho state that every person shall drive at a safe and
appropriate speed when approaching and crossing an intersection) when approaching and going
around a curve, when approaching a hillcrest, when traveling upon any narrow or winding

highway, and when special haz.ards exist with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by reason
of weather or highway conditions.
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JURy INSTRUCTION NO,

The statutes of the State ofldaho state that no person shall drive a motor vehicle at such a
slow speed as to impede the normal and reasonable movement of traffic except when reduced
speed is necessary for safe operation or in compliance with the law.

J)1

J lJN/29/20 IO/TUE fJ3: 25 PM

STIRI)'A &

lATES

FAX N0,

~Ul

~j

P, U 4

JURy INS TRUCTION NO.

The statutes of the State of Idaho state that a vehicle shall be driven upon the right half of
the roadway.
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JURY INS TRUCTION NO,

The statutes of the State of Idaho state that upon the immediate approach of an authorized
emergency or police vehicle making use of an audible Ot visible signal, the driver of every other
vehicle must yield the right-of-way and immediately drive to a position parallel to, and as close
as possible to, the nearest edge or curb of the highway lawful for parking and clear of any
intersection. and stop and remain in that position until the authorized emergency or police
vehicle has passed, except when otherwise directed by a peace officer.
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JURy INSTRUCTION NO.

The statutes of the State ofIdaho state that every driver of a vehicle shall exercise due
care to avoid colliding with any pedestrian or any perSOn propelling a human-powered vehicle
and shall give an audible signal when necessary. Every driver shall exercise proper precaution
upon observing any child or any obviously confused, incapacitated or intoxicated person.
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO.
The statutes of Idaho state that the primary responsibility of the county sheriff to enforce
aU penal provisions of any and all statutes of the state of Idaho. In order to carry out this duty to
preserve the peace, the county sheriff is required to prevent and suppress all breaches of the

peace which may COme to his knowledge and arrest all persons Who attempt to commit or who
have committed a public offense.
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JlJRYINSTRUCTION NO.

An agency relationship exists where one. called the "principal," has authorized

another. called the "agent," to act on behalf of the principal. Age11cy requires the consent of the
principal. which may be express or implied. The term "principal" includes employers and the

term Hagent" includes employees.
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JlJRYlNSTRUCT10N NO.

The principal is responsible for the acts of ~ts agent that are within the agenf s scope of
authority.
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JlJRYINSTRUCTION NO.

Conduct is v.tithin the scope of the agent's authority if it occurs while the agent is
engaged in the duties that the agent was asked Or expected to perform and relates to those duties,

It is not necessary that a particular act or failure to act be expressly authorized by the principal to
bring it within the scope of the agent's authority. Conduct for the benefit of the principal that is
customarily connected with, or reasonably necessary for the performance of such duties is within
the scope of the agent's authority.
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JURYlNSTRUCTION NO.

1 will nOW instruct you concerning the Plaintiff's claims of damages. Dle fact that I give
you instructions regarding damages does not mean that I believe the Plaintiff is entitled to
recover any damages in this case. Instructions about damages are given to you merely as a guide
in the event you tInd from a preponderance of the evidence that the Plaintiffis entitled to

recover. If you find the issues in favor of the Defendant, you shall disregard my instructions
about damages.
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JURYlNSTRUCTION NO.
If you find the issues in favor Dfthe Plaintiff and against the Defendant, it will be your
duty to award the Plaintiff such damages, if any, as you may find from a preponderance of the

evidence will fairly and adequately compensate Plaintiff for any injury and damage he has
sustained as a proximate result of the Defendant's negligence complained of by Plaintiff.
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JURY INS TRUCTION NO.

Ifycu should find that Plaintiff is entitled to a verdict, in arriving at the amount of the
award you should include:
(a)

Any reasonable and necessary expense to the Plaintiff for medical,

surgical, hospital and other services, care and supplies which you find by a

preponderance of the evidence has already been incurred as a result of the accident or
which you find by a preponderance of evidence will be required to be expended in future
treatment of the Plaintiff as a result of the accident in question; and,
(b)

The reasonable value of the time, if any, shown by the evidence in the case

to have been necessarily been lost up to date by Plaintiff since the injury because of being
unable to pursue his occupation as a result of the injury. In determining this amount, you

should consider any evidence of Plaintiffs earning capacity, his earnings, the manner in
which he ordinarily occupied his time before the injury, and find what he was reasonably
certain to have earned during the time so lost had Plaintiff not been dis.abled; and,
(c)

Also, s'uch sum as will reasonably compensate Plaintiff for any 10s8 of

future earning power caused by the injury in question whlch you find from the evidence
in the case that PlaintiffwUl probably suffer in the future. In determining this amount,
you should consider what Plaintiff's health, physical ability and earning power were
betore the accident and what they are now; the nature and extent of Plaintiff' S injuries,
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whether or not they probably will be permanent or, ifnot permanent, the extent of their
duration; all to the end of determining, first, the effect, if any, of Plaintiffs injury upon

his future earning capacity; and, second, the present value of any loss offuture eaming
power which you find from the evidence in the case that Plaintiff will probably suffer in
the future as a resulr of the injury in questions; and,
(d)

Such sum as will compensate Plaintiff reasonably for any plain, suffering and

mental anguish already suffered by him and reSUlting from the injury in question and for any
pain, su1'tering and mental anguish which your tInd form the evidence in the case that Plaintiff

will pro;)ably suffer in the future form the same cause.

fn~tr-
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

You are the sole judges of the amount of damages, if any; sustained by Plaintiff, You are
not bOUnd to accept any opinion offered by any expert witness on the issue of damages. nor are
you required to accept any method, reason or theory on which any expelt relies. There is no
precisely accurate method by which to calculate the damages claimed by Plaintiff. If you find by
a preponderance of the evidence that the Plailltiffhas incurred some damage) you are not bound
to employ any particularly method in determining the amount of damage, but you may use your
own sense, judgment and experience in determining what is reasonable and fair.
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO.
Damages must be reasonable, If you should find that the Plaintiff is entitled to a verdict,
you may award only such damage as will reasonably compensation Plaintiff for such injury and
damage as you may find from a preponderance of the evidence that Plaintiff has sustained,
You are note permitted to award any damages that are speculative. If you deicide to
award any damages, you can award only such damages as you lllay find the Plaintiff has proved
by a preponderance of the evidence, Damages that are possible, but not probable> are speculative
and cannot be awruded.
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r, U) i

ruRY INS TRUCTION NO.

A person who has a condition, pain. or disability at the time of an injury is not entitled to
tecOver damages therefore. However, he is entitled to recover damages for any aggravation of
such preexisting condition, pain, or disability proximately resulting from the injury.

which was causing pain or disability) and further find that because of this occurrence the
condition or the pain Or the disability was aggravated, then if your verdict is in favor of the
Plaintiff you should consider t.~e aggravation of the condition ar the pain or the disability
proxin1ately due to such aggravation, but you should not consider any condition, pain, Qr
disability which may have existed prior to the occurrence, or from which the Plaintiff may now
be suffering which was not caused or contributed to by reason of this occurrence.
You are to apportion, if possible, between the condition, pain or disability prior to this
occurrence, and the condition, pain ot disability caused by this occurrence, and assess liability
accordingly. If no apportionment can reasonably be made by you, thell the Defendant is liable
for the entire damage.

:r~
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JURV INS TRUCTION NO.

If you should find that the Plaintiff is entitled to recover any damages for any loss of
income or for any expenditure of medical expenses that will not occur until SOme time in the
future, you must reduce any such damages to their present value. You calculate the present value
on the assumption that any money you might award. except the amount currently needed,

win be

invested so as to yield the highest interest or return that is available with reasonable security,
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JURy INSTRUCTION NO.
With regard to diminished future income, the Plaintiff has a duty to minimize his
damages by making reasonable efforts to seek employment in any work that he is capable of
performing and by earning as much as he can. If you find that the Plaintiff is entitled to be
compensated for loss of future income, then you must reduce his damages by all sums the
Plaintiff could reasonably be expected to earn from the employment, which Plaintiff is tequired
to pursue in mitigation of his loss.

/33

nu,. 110, aUl

jO'1 (jJJJ

[, U

Ij

JlJRY INSTRUCTION NO.

The standard table of mortality which the Court has judicially noticed and received in
evidence. in this case may be considered by you in determining how long the Plaintiff may live.
According to the table of mortality, the life expectancy in this

C0U11try

for a male person 26 years

of age is 77.
Life expectancy, as shown by a mortality table~ is merely an estimate of the probable
average remaining length of life of all persons in the United States of a given age and sex, and
that estimate is based upon a limited record of experience, So. the infel'ence which may

reasonably be dra'Nll from life expectancy, as shown by the table, applies only to one who has
the average health and exposure to danger of people of that age and sex.
In determining the reasonably certain life expectancy of the Plajntiff, you should
consider, in addition to what is shown by the table of mortality, all other facts and circumstances
iIl evidence in the case bearing upon the life expectancy of the Plaintiff, including his

occupation. habits. past health record and present state of health.
When considering life expectancy) in determining any reasonable certain future damage.
you will bear in mind,

()f

ct)"lirse, the distinction between entire-life expectancy a.nd work-life

expectancy.
Those elemenTS of damages that are related to future income should be measured only by
tlle Plaintiffs remaining work-life expectancy, not his entire life expecla1'lcy.

Def
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

It is your duty, as jurors, to consult with one another and to deliberate with a view of
reaching an agreement, if you call do so without violence to individual judgment. You must each
decide the case for yourself, but only after an impartial consideration of the evidence in the case
with your i'elluw jurors. In the course ofyoux deliberations, do no hesitate to re-examine your
own views aDd change your opinion if convinced it is erroneous. But, do not surrender your

honest conviction as to the weight or effect of evidence. solely because of the opinion of your
fellow jururs or for the mere purpose of returning a verdict.
R ",member at all times that you are not partisans. You are judges

Your s"le interest is tb seek the truth from the evidence in the case,

of the facts,
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Exhibit "B"

/nst

r.

U if

rfl.A 110. OUi JO'! OJJ]

r.

IJ

J

IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BEAR LAKE
KYLEATHAY,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CV -02-00072

v.

SPECIAL VERDICT

RICH COUNTY, UTAH,
Defendant.

We, the jury, answer the questions submitted to us in the special verdict as follows:
QUESTION NO.1.

Did Plaintiff establish by a preponderance of evidence that Sheriff

Stacey acted with reckless disregard while pursuing the intoxicated motorist, Daryl Ervin?
ANSWER:

QlJESTION NO.2.

Yes

No

If Sheriff Stacey acted with reckless disregard, was his

recklessness a proximate cause of the Plaintiff's accident?
ANSWER:

Yes

No

QUESTION NO.3. If Sheriff Stacey a.cted with reckless disregard, was his reckless
conduct established by a preponderance of evidence to be within the scope of his employment
with Rich County and, therefore, attributable to Rich County?

)37
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ANSWER:

Yes

LU l'la,tiUJ jtJiJ: 0
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t', U 4

No

I[you have answered each of the Questions Nos. 1,2 and 3 "Yea," then please answer
the 1Ol1l)Wing questions. If you have answered any of the Questions Nos. 1 2 and 3 "No," you
j

wil:Jl' 1 answer the remaining questions, but will simply sign the verdict.

QUESTION NO.4,

Was the intoxicated motorist, Daryl Ervin, lIegligel!t and was his

negligence a proximate cause of the Plaintiff's accident?

ANSWER:
QUESTION NO.5.

Yes

No

Was there negligence on the part of Gregg Athay that was a

proximate cause of the Plaintiff's accident?
ANSWER:
QUESTION NO.6.

Yes

No

Was there negligence on the part of Chad Ludwig tllat was a

proximale cause of the Plaintiff's accident?

ANSWER;
QUESTION NO.7.

Yes

No

Was there negligence on the part ofthe Bear Lake County that was

a P1Q:xj :nate cause of the Plaintiff s accident?
ANSWER:

QUESTION NO.8.

Yes

No

Was there negligence on the part of the Plaintiff: Kyle Athay that

was a proximate eause of the Plaintiff's accident?
ANSWER:

Yes

No

SPECIAL VERDICT
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Was there negligence on the part of the Wyoming Downs that was

a proximate cause of the Plaintiff's accident?

ANSWER:

Yes

No

If you answered "No" to Questions Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 and 9, you should not answer
Question No.IO, but will next answer Question No. 11.

riyau answered I'No" to any of the preceding questions, then insert a zero (0) in the
answer to the appropriate line in Question No. 11. If you answered any of the preceding
questions "Yes,ll insert in the appropriate liDe in the answer to Question No. II the percentage of

causation you find attributable to that party.
QUESTION NO. 10. We find the parties contributed to the cause of the Plaintiffs
injuries in the following percentages:
(a)

Rich County

(b)

Daryl Ervin

(c)

Gregg Athay

(d)

Chad Ludwig

%

(c)

Bear Lake County

%

(t)

Kyle Athay

(g)

Wyoming Downs

%

-_%

%
TOTAL 100 %

3
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QUESTION NO, 11. What is the total amount of damages sustained by Kyle Athay as a
result of the accident?

ANSWER:

Dated this __ day ofJuty, 2010

FOREPERSON

SPECIAL
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!TRICT COURT
SIXTH JUDICIAL COURT
BEAR LAKE COUNTY IDAHO
J~ ~ ,J.D.} 0::::--_ __
- --:DJATE r
TIME
CLERK
DEPUTY

CASE NO.

ALAN JOHNSTON (Idaho Bar No. 7709)
E. W. PIKE & ASSOCIATES, P .A.

151 North Ridge Ave., Suite 210
P.O. Box 2949
Idaho Falls, ID 83403-2949

Telephone: (208) 528-6444
Telefax: (208) 528-6447

PETER S11RBA (Utah Bar No. 3118)
R. BLAKE HAMILTON (Utah Bar No. 11395)
STIRBA & ASSOCIAYES
215 South State Street. Suite 750

P.O. Box IHO
~alt Lake City, UT 84110~0810
Telephone: (801) 364-8300
Telefax: (801) 364-8355

Auorneyg for Defendant
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BEAR LAKE

Case No. CV-02-00072

Plaintiff:

DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED
j~h'H

SUPPLEMENTAL JURy INSTRUCTIONS
AND SPECIAL VERDICT FORM

COUNTY, UTAH,

Defeudant.

Defendant Rich County, Utah; by alld through lUldel'signed counsel, hereby submits its
proposed supplemental jury instructions purSl.'lltnt to LRC.P. 51. One original and one copy of

It! I
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Defendant's proposed instructions have been attached hereto. Pursuant to LR.C.P. 51(a)(1), the
originals eontam a blank space for numbering. See Attachment "A." The duplicates are
numberod and contain citations, See Attachment "B."
DATED thislday of July. 2010.

STlRBA & ASSOCIATES

By:
R. BLAKE HAMILTON

PETER STIRBA
Attorneys for Defendant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

<iJ

day of July, 2010 I caused to be served a true

copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT'S PROPOSED SUPPLEMENTAL JlJRY
INSTRUCfIONS AND SPECIAL VERDICT by the method indicated below, to the
following:

Craig R Jorgensen, Esq.
Attorney at Law
1246 Yellowstone Avenue, Suite A4
P.O, Box 4904
Pocatello, In 83205-4904
Attorney for Plaintiffs
Alan Johnston
E. W. PIKE & ASSOCIATES, P.A
t51 North Ridge Ave" Suite 210
P.O. Box 2949
Idaho Falls> ID 83403-2949

() U.S. Mail. Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
()~ghtMail

(..:yFacsimile

() U.S. Mail. Postage Prepaid
( ) Hand Delivered
( )~tght Mail

(-1"F acsimile

Attorney for Defendants

Honorable Mitchell W. Brown
District Judge .- Resident Chambers

P.O. Box 775
Soda Springs. Idaho 83276

() U.S. Mail, Postage Prepaid
() Hand Delivered
() Ov 'ght Mail
acsimile
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO.

The law ofthls case is that Mr. Daryl John Ervin, Jr., pled guilty to the felony crimes of
eludillg a police officer and ~lggravated driving under the influence of alcohol.
Under Idaho law, 1. C. § 49-1404, a person is guilty of eluding a police officer if the
driver of a motor vehicle willfully flees or attempts to elttde a pursuing police vehicle when
given h visual ar audible signal to bring the vehicle to a stop, and while so doing: (a) travels in
excess 01 thirty (30) miles per hour above the posted speed limit; (b) causes damage to the
prop(~rty

of another or bodily injury to another; (0) drives his vehicle in a manner as to endanger

or likelY to endanger the property of another or the person of another; or Cd) leaves the state,

Under Idaho law, I.e. § 18~8006; a person is gUilty of aggravated driving under the
in±luence of alcohol if a person, while under the influence of alcohol, drugs or any other
intoxicating substances. or any combination of alcohol, drugs and/or any other intoxicating
6ubstimces, or who has an alcohol concentration ofO.OS or more) as shown by analysis of his
bi.lad, urine or breath, drives or is in actual physical control of a motor vehicle within this State,

whether upon a highway, street or bridge, or upon public or private property open to the public
and causes great bodily harm, permanent disability or permanent disfigurement to any person

other than himself.

/#

J ULl08/2 U1O/THU

47

&

FAX No,801 ,)48 5

p, 006

JlJRY INSTRUCTION NO.
The law of this case is that the Idaho Supreme Court had determined that the actions of
Bear Lake County Officers Greg Athay and Chad Ludwig during the pursuit of1vfr. Daryl John

Ervin, Ir., did not, as a matter of law, amolmt to reckless disregard.

·
FILED
IN THE DISTRICT C01JRT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICtt&i{t~lf;'{ C~~=;!::/~!:b_
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BEAR LAKE
- "'-,,, I
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KYLED, ATIlAY,

DI

) Case No,
CV -2002-00072
)
)
SPECIAL VERDICT FORM
)
)

Plaintiff,
VS.

RICH COUNTY, UTAH,

)
)
)
)

Defendant.

------------------ ----------)
We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows:

Question No.1: Was Sheriff Dale Stacey's conduct on June 10, 1999 within in the scope
of his authority as an agent of Rich County, Utah?
Answer to Question No.1: Yes

l2{J

NoL..J

Qnestion No.2: Did Sheriff Dale Stacey's conduct amount to reckless disregard, and if
so, was this reckless disregard a proximate cause of Kyle Athay's injuries?
Answer to Question No.2: Yes

LXJ

No

[--.-J

If you answered "No," to either question 1 or 2 you are done. Sign the verdict as
instructed and advise the Bailiff. If you answered this question "Yes," continue to the
next question.

Question No.3: Was Kyle Athay negligent, and if so, was this negligence a proximate
cause of his own injuries?
Answer to Question No.3: Yes

L..J

NolJU

Question No.4: Was Daryl Ervin negligent, and if so was his negligence a proximate
cause of the Kyle Athay's injuries?
Answer to Question No.4: Yes

L2(J

NoL..J

If you answered "Yes" to either or both of questions 3 and 4, answer Question No.5. If
you answered "No" to both Questions 3 and 4, then skip to Question No.6.

Instruction for Question No.5: You will reach this question if you have found that the
Sheriff Dale Stacey acted with reckless disregard and either or both Kyle Athay and
Daryl Ervin were negligent, which reckless disregard and negligence caused the injuries
to Kyle Athay. In this question, you are to apportion the fault between these parties in
terms of a percentage. As to each party or entity to which you answered "Yes" to
questions 2, 3, and 4, determine the percentage of fault for that party or entity, and enter
the percentage on the appropriate line. If you answered "No" to any of the above
questions, insert a "0" or "Zero" as to that party or entity. Your total percentages must
equal 100%.
Question No.5: \Vhat is the percentage of fault (if any) you assign to each of the
follO\ving:
Sheriff Dale Stacey, agent of Rich County,
Kyle Athay
Daryl Ervin
Total must equal

100%

If the percentage of fault you assigned to the Kyle Athay is equal to or greater than the
percentage of fault you assigned to the Rich County, Utah, you are done. Sign the verdict
and advise the Bailiff. If the percentage of fault assigned to Kyle Athay is less than the
percentage of fault you assigned to Sheriff Dale Stacey, agent of Rich County, answer the
next question.
Question No.6: What is the total amount of damage sustained by the Kyle Athay as a
result of the accident?
Answer to Question No.6: We assess Kyle Athay's damages as follows:
1. Economic damages, as defined in the Instructions:
$
:;),;' 72.0/ I 2 {p
2. Non-economic damages, as defined in the Instructions:

/if1

Juror
Juror
Juror
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INSTRUCTION NO.1
Your duties are to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in my instructions
to those facts, and in this way to decide of your own opinion of what the law is or should
be, or what either side may state the law to be. You must consider them as a whole, not
picking out one and disregarding others. The order in which the instructions are given has
no significance as to their relative importance. The law requires that your decision be
made solely upon the evidence before you.

Neither sympathy nor prejudice should

influence you in your deliberations. Faithful performance by you of these duties is vital
the administration of justice.
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this
trial. This evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits offered and
received, and any stipulated or admitted facts. The production of evidence in Court is
governed by rules of law. At times during the trial, an objection may be made to a
question asked a witness, or to a witness' answer, or to an exhibit. This simply means
that I am being asked to decide a particular rule of law. Arguments on the admissibility
of evidence are designed to aid the Court and are not to be considered by you nor affect
your deliberations. If I sustain an objection to a question or to an exhibit, the witness
may not answer the question or the exhibit may not be considered. Do not attempt to
guess what the answer might have been or what the exhibit might have shown. Similarly,
if I tell you not to consider a particular statement or exhibit you should put it out of your
mind, and not refer to it or rely on it in your later deliberations.
During the trial I may have to talk with the parties about the rules of law which
should apply in this case. Sometimes we will talk here at the bench. At other times I will
excuse you from the courtroom so that you can be comfortable while we work out any

/ </1

problems. You are not to speculate about any such discussions. They are necessary from
time to time and help the trial run more smoothly.
Some of you have probably heard the terms "circumstantial evidence," "direct
evidence" and "hearsay evidence." Do not be concerned with these terms. You are to
consider all the evidence admitted in this trial.
However, the law does not require you to believe all the evidence. As the sole
judges of the facts, you must determine what evidence you believe and what weight you
attach to it.
There is no magical formula by which one may evaluate testimony. You bring
with you to this courtroom all of the experience and background of your lives. In your
everyday affairs you determine for yourselves whom you believe, what you believe, and
how much weight you attach to what you are told. The same considerations that you use
in your everyday dealings in making these decisions are the considerations which you
should apply in your deliberations.
In deciding what you believe, do not make your decision simply because more
witnesses may have testified one way than the other. Your role is to think about the
testimony of each witness you heard and decide how much you believe of what the
witness had to say.
A witness who has special knowledge in a particular matter may give an opinion
on that matter. In determining the weight to be given such opinion, you should consider
the qualifications and credibility of the witness and the reasons given for the opinion.
You are not bound by such opinion. Give it the weight, if any, to which you deem it
entitled.

INSTRUCTION NO.2
If during the trial I may say or do anything which suggests to you that I am
inclined to favor the claims or position of any party, you will not permit yourself to be
influenced by any such suggestion. I will not express nor intend to express, nor will I
intend to intimate, any opinion as to which witnesses are or not worthy of belief, what
facts are or are not established; or what inferences should be drawn from the evidence. If
any expression of mine seems to indicate an opinion relating to any of these matters, I
instruct you to disregard it.

/51

INSTRUCTION NO.3
There are certain things you must not do during this trial:
1. You must not associate in any way with the parties, any of the
attorneys or their employees, or any of the witnesses.
2. You must not discuss the case with anyone, or permit anyone to
discuss the case with you. If anyone attempts to discuss the cause with
you, or to influence your decision in the case, you must report it to me
promptly.
3 . You must not discuss the case with other jurors until you retire to the
jury room to deliberate in the close of the entire case.
4. You must not make up your mind until you have heard all of the
testimony and have received my instructions as to the law that applies
to the case.
5 . You must not contact anyone in an attempt to discuss or gain a greater
understanding of the case.
6.

You must not go to the place where any alleged even occurred.

INSTRUCTION NO.4
During your deliberations, you will be entitled to have with you my instructions
concerning the law that applies to this case, the exhibits that have been admitted into
evidence and any notes taken by you in the course of the trial proceedings.
If you take notes during the trial, be careful that your attention is not thereby
diverted from the witness or his testimony; and you must keep your notes to yourself and
not show them to other persons or jurors until the jury deliberations at the end of the trial.

/5:3

INSTRUCTION NO.5
Any statement by me identifying a claim of a party is not evidence in this case. I
have advised you of the claims of the parties merely to acquaint you with the issues to be
decided.

/(}f
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INSTRUCTION NO 6
In this case the Plaintiff, Kyle Athay, claims that these are the facts: That on June
10, 1999, Dale Stacey, Sheriff of Rich County, Utah, began pursuing Daryl Ervin near
Randolph, Utah and continued to pursue him until Ervin collided with the Plaintiff,
seriously injuring him. Thus, the Plaintiff seeks recovery for his damages.

INSTRUCTION NO.7
Plaintiff Kyle Athay claims that Rich County, Utah, is liable for the damages the
Plaintiff allegedly suffered as a result of a vehicle collision between Kyle Athay and
Daryl Ervin on June 10, 1999, while Mr. Ervin was being pursued by Sheriff Stacey and
Bear Lake County Deputies Gregg Athay and Chad Ludwig.
In defense, Rich County claims it is not liable because Sheriff Stacey acted with
the appropriate level of care during the relevant incident and because Sheriff Stacey's
conduct was not a proximate cause of Plaintiff's alleged damages. Defendant further
claims that the incident was caused solely or partially by the recklessness of Daryl Ervin,
and may have been cause by the negligence of others.
Additionally, Rich County claims that if Sheriff Stacey's conduct is found to be
reckless, this conduct falls outside the scope of Stacey's employment with Rich County
and thus Rich County cannot be held liable for any injuries proximately cause by
Stacey's recklessness.
This instruction is not intended to be a statement of facts nor what the evidence in
this case has shown, but rather it is merely a summary by the Court of the respective
claims made by the parties in this case.

:f1l.Hj In sir
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INSTRUCTION NO.8

I have previously instructed you that this accident occurred on June 10, 1999.
The date of the accident and the length of time that has elapsed since it occurred is not
something for you to speculate about or to concern yourself with as you hear the evidence
and deliberate. All civil cases take time to get to trial and you are not to attach any
significance to the fact that. this case is now going to trial and the event in question
occurred in 1999.

/51

INSTRUCTION NO.1
These instructions explain your duties as jurors and define the law that applies to this
case. It is your duty to determine the facts, to apply the law set forth in these instructions to
those facts, and in this way to decide the case. Your decision should be based upon a
rational and objective assessment of the evidence. It should not be based on sympathy or
prejudice.
It is my duty to instruct you on the points of law necessary to decide the case, and it
is your duty to follow the law as I instruct. You must consider these instructions as a whole,
not picking out one and disregarding others. The order in which these instructions are given
or the manner in which they are numbered has no significance as to the importance of any of
them. If you do not understand an instruction, you may send a note to me through the
bailiff, and I will try to clarify or explain the point further.
In determining the facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this trial.
This evidence consists of the testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits admitted into evidence,
and any stipulated or admitted facts. While the arguments and remarks of the attorneys may
help you tmderstand the evidence and apply the instructions, what they say is not evidence.

If an attorney's argument or remark has no basis in the evidence, you should disregard it.
The production of evidence in court is governed by rule of law. At times during the
trial, I sustained an objection to a question without permitting the witness to answer it, or to
an offered exhibit without receiving it into evidence. My rnlings are legal matters, and are
solely my responsibility. You must not speculate as to the reason for any objection, which
was made, or my ruling thereon, and in reaching your decision you may not consider such a
question or exhibit or speculate as to what the answer or exhibit would have shown.

Remember, a question is not evidence and should be considered only as it gives meaning to
the answer.
There were occasions where an objection was made after an answer was given or the
remark was made, and in my ruling on the objection I instructed that the answer or remark
be stricken, or directed that you disregard the answer or remark and dismiss it from your
minds. In your deliberations, you must not consider such answer or remark, but must treat it
as though you had never heard it.
The law does not require you to believe all of the evidence admitted in the course
of the trial. As the sale judges of the facts, you must determine what evidence you
believe and what weight you attach to it.

In so doing, you bring with you to this

courtroom all of the experience and background of your lives.

There is no magical

formula for evaluating testimony. In your everyday affairs, you determine for yourselves
whom you believe, what you believe and how much weight you attach to what you are
told.

The considerations you use in making the more important decisions in your

everyday dealings are the same considerations you should apply in your deliberations in
this case.
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INSTRUCTION NO.2
During your deliberations, you will be entitled to have with you my instructions
concerning the law that applies to this case, the exhibits that have been admitted into
evidence and any notes taken by you in the course of the trial proceedings.
If you take notes during the trial, be careful that your attention is not thereby
diverted from the witness or his testimony; and you must keep your notes to yourself and
not show them to other persons or jurors until the jury deliberations at the end of the triaL

INSTRUCTION NO.3
Certain evidence was presented to you by deposition. A deposition is testimony
taken under oath before the trial and preserved in writing. This evidence is entitled to the
same consideration you would give had the witness testified from the witness stand.
You will only receive this testimony in open court. Although there is a record of the
testimony you are about to hear, this record will not be available to you during your
deliberations.

INSTRUCTION NO.4
Evidence may be either direct or circumstantiaL Direct evidence is evidence that
directly proves a fact. Circumstantial evidence is evidence that indirectly proves the fact, by
proving one or more facts from which the fact at issue may be inferred.
The law makes no distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence as to the
degree of proof required; each is accepted as a reasonable method of proof and each is
respected for such convincing force as it may carry.

INSTRUCTION NO. 5
The rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit the opinion of a witness to be
received as evidence. An exception to this rule exists in the case of expert witnesses. A
person who, by education, study and experience, has become an expert in an art, science or
profession, and who is called as a witness, may give his opinion as to any such matter in
which he is versed and which is material to the case. You should consider such expert
opinion and should weigh the reasons, if any, given for it. You are not bound, however, by
such an opinion. Give it the weight which you deem it entitled, whether that be great or
slight, and you may reject it, if in your judgment the reasons given for it are unsound.

INSTRUCTION NO.6
In this case, certain evidence was admitted for a limited purpose. I called your
attention to this when the evidence was admitted. I remind you that whenever evidence was
admitted for a limited purpose, you must not consider such evidence for any purpose other
than the limited purpose for which it was admitted.

INSTRUCTION NO.7
Rich County, Utah is the Defendant in tills case and is a county in the State of Utah.
Rich County is entitled to the same fair and unprejudiced treatment that an individual would
be under like circumstances. You should decide this case with the same impartiality that you
would use in deciding a case between individuals.

INSTRUCTION NO. 8
You are instructed that Sheriff Dale Stacey, Deputy Sheriff Gregg Athay, Deputy
Sheriff Chad Ludwig and Bear Lake County are not parties to tIus action. You are not to
speculate or consider in your deliberations the disposition of any claims associated with
Bear Lake County and/or Deputy Sheriffs Gregg Athay or Chad Ludwig, or Sheriff Dale
Stacey. You should consider only the case as it relates to Rich County, Utah.

INSTRUCTION NO.9

When I say that a party has the burden of proof on a proposition, or use the
expression "if you find" or "if you decide," I mean you must be persuaded that the
proposition is more probably true than not true.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 10
When I use the word "negligence" in these instructions, I mean the failure to use
ordinary care in the management of one's property or person. The words "ordinary care"
mean the care a reasonably careful person would use under circumstances similar to those
shown by the evidence. Negligence may thus consist of the failure to do something which a
reasonably careful person would do, or the doing of something a reasonably careful person
would not do, under circumstances similar to those shown by the evidence. The law does
not say how a reasonably careful person would act under those circumstances. That is for
you to decide.

INSTRUCTION NO. 11

There was a certain statute in force in the state of Idaho at the time of the occurrence
in question which provided that:
It is unlawful for any person who is under the influence of alcohol, drugs or
any other intoxicating substances, or any combination of alcohol drugs
and/or any other intoxicating substances, or who has an alcohol
concentration of 0.08 or more as shown by analysis of his blood, urine or
breath, to drive or be in actual physical control of a motor vehicle within this
state, whether upon a highway, street or bridge, or upon public or private
property open to the public.

A violation of the statute is negligence.

INSTRUCTION NO. 12

There was a certain statute in force in the state ofIdaho at the time of the occurrence
in question which provided that:
Any driver of a motor vehicle who willfully flees or attempts to elude a
pursing police vehicle when given a visual or audible signal to bring the
vehicle to a stop ... and while so doing:
(a) Travels in excess of thirty (30) miles per hour above the posted speed
limit;
(b) Causes damage to the property of another or bodily injury to another;
(c) Drives his vehicle in a manner as to endanger or likely to endanger
the property of another or the person of another; or
(d) Leaves the state;
is guilty of a felony.
A violation of the statute is negligence.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 13
There was a certain statute in force in the state of Idaho at the time of the occurrence
in question which provided that:
No person shall drive a vehicle at a speed greater than is reasonable
and prudent under the conditions and having regard to the actual and
potential hazards then existing. Consistent with the foregoing, every
person shall drive at a safe and appropriate speed when approaching
and crossing an intersection or railroad grade crossing, when
approaching and going around a curve, when approaching a hillcrest,
when traveling upon any narrow or winding highway, and when
special hazards exist with respect to pedestrians or other traffic or by
reason of weather or highway conditions.
A violation of the statute is negligence.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 14
There was a certain statute in force in the state of Idaho at the time of the occurrence
in question which provided that:
No person shall drive a motor vehicle at such a slow speed as to impede
the normal and reasonable movement of traffic except when reduced speed
is necessary for safe operation or in compliance 'with the law.
A violation of the statute is negligence.

Ins
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INSTRUCTION NO. 15

There was a certain statute in force in the state of Idaho at the time of the occurrence
in question which provided that:
(1) Upon all highways of sufficient width a vehicle shall be driven upon
the right half ofthe roadway except as follows:

***

(b) When an obstruction exists making it necessary to drive to the left of
the center of the highway. Any person doing so shall yield the right-ofway to all vehicles traveling in the proper direction upon the unobstructed
portion of the highway within a distance as to constitute an immediate
hazard;
A violation of the statute is negligence.

1,3

INSTRUCTION NO. 16
There was a certain statute in force in the state of Idaho at the time of the occurrence
in question which provided that:
(1) Upon the immediate approach of an authorized emergency or police
vehicle making use of an audible or visible signal ... the driver of every
other vehicle shall yield the right-of-way and immediately drive to a
position parallel to, and as close as possible to, the nearest edge or curb of
the highway lawful for parking and clear of any intersection, and stop and
remain in that position until the authorized emergency or police vehicle
has passed, except when otherwise directed by a peace officer.
(2) This section shall not operate to relieve the driver of an authorized
emergency or police vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the
safety of all persons using the highway.
A violation of the statute is negligence.

INSTRUCTION NO. 17
(1)

The driver of an authorized emergency or police vehicle may exercise the

privileges set forth below, when responding to an emergency call, or when in the pursuit of
an actual or suspected violator of the law, or when responding to a fire alarm. When
necessary to warn, the vehicle being operated at the time must make use of an audible signal
having a decibel rating of at least one hundred (100) at a distance of ten (10) feel and/or
display a flashing light visible in a 360 degree arc at a distance of one thousand (1,000) feet,
under nOlmal atmospheric conditions.
Under the above circumstances, the driver may:

(2)
(a)

Park or stand, irrespective of the parking or standing
provision of law;

(b)

Proceed past a red or stop signal or stop sign, but only
after slovving dovm as may be necessary for safe operation;

(c)

Exceed the maximum speed limits so long as he does
not endanger life or property;

(d)

Disregard

regulations

govemmg

direction

of

movement or turning in specified directions.
(3)

The foregoing provisions shall not relieve the driver of an authorized
emergency or police vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the
safety of all persons, nor shall these provisions protect the driver from the
consequences of his reckless disregard for the safety of others.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 18

A person acts with reckless disregard if the person's conduct creates an unreasonable
risk of bodily harm, and the person actually perceives the high degree of probability that
harm will result and he continues in his course of conduct
Actual knowledge of the high degree of probability that harm will result does not
require knowledge of the actual person or persons at risk or the exact manner in which they
would be hanned. It only requires knowledge of the high degree of probability of the kind of
harm that the injured party suffered.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 19

When I use the expression "proximate cause," I mean a cause which, in natural or
probable sequence, produced the complained injury, loss or damage, and but for that cause
the damage would not have occurred. It need not be the only cause. It is sufficient if it is a
substantial factor in bringing about the injury, loss or damage. It is not a proximate cause if
the inj}1fY, loss or damage likely would have occurred anyway_
There may be one or more proximate causes of an injury. When the negligent
conduct and/or reckless disregard of two or more persons or entities contribute concurrently
as substantial factors in bringing about an injury, the conduct of each may be a proximate
cause of the injury regardless of the extent to which each contributes to the injury.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 20

The term "agent" refers to a person authorized by another, called the "principal," to
act for or in the place of the principal. The principal is responsible for any act of the agent
within the agent's scope of authority.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 21

Conduct is Virithin the scope of the agent's authority if it occurs while the agent is
engaged in the duties that the agent was asked or expected to perfonn and relates to those
duties. It is not necessary that a particular act or failure to act be expressly authorized by the
principal to bring it within the scope of the agent's authority. Conduct for the benefit of the
principal that is incidental to, customarily connected with, or reasonably necessary for the
perfonnance of such duties is within the scope of the agent's authority.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 22

The plaintiff has the burden of proof on the following proposition:

1. That Sheriff Dale Stacey's conduct on June 10, 1999 was within the scope of his
authority as an agent of Rich County, Utah.
If you fmd from your consideration of all the evidence that this proposition has been
proved, then you should answer this question "yes." If you find from your consideration of
all the evidence that this proposition has not been proved, then you should answer this
question "no."

J~O

INSTRUCTION NO. 23

The plaintiff, Kyle Athay, has the burden of proof on each

the following

propositions:
1. That Sheriff Dale Stacey acted with reckless disregard.
2. That the Kyle Athay was injured.
3. That the conduct of Sheriff Dale Stacey amounting to reckless disregard was a
proximate cause of the injury to Kyle Athay.
4. The elements of damage and the amounts thereof.
You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form:
Did Sheriff Dale Stacey act with reckless disregard, and if so, was the reckless
disregard a proximate cause of the injuries to Kyle Athay?
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these
propositions has been proved, you should answer this question "Yes." However, if you find
that any of these propositions has not been proved, then Kyle Athay
of proof required and you should answer this question ''No.''
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not met the burden

INSTRUCTION NO. 24
In this case, the defendant, Rich County, has alleged that Kyle Athay was negligent.
On this defense, Rich County has the burden of proof on each of the following propositions:
1. The Kyle Athay was negligent.
2. TIle negligence of Kyle Athay was a proximate cause ofllis own injuries.
You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict fonn:
Was the Kyle Athay negligent, and if so was Kyle Athay's negligence a proximate
cause oflus injuries?

If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these propositions has
been proved, you should answer this question "Yes." However, if you find that any of these
propositions has not been proved, then the Rich COlmty has not met the burden of proof
required and you should answer this question "No."

/

INSTRUCTION NO. 24(a)
In this case, the defendant has alleged that Daryl Ervin an indivIdual not a party to
this lawsuit, was negligent. On this defense, the defendant has the burden of proof on each
of the following propositions:
1. That Daryl Ervin was negligent.
2. The negligence of Daryl Ervin was a proximate cause of Kyle Athay's injuries.
You will be asked the following question on the jury verdict form:
Was Daryl Ervin negligent, and if so was Daryl Ervin's negligence a proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injuries?
If you find from your consideration of all the evidence that each of these
propositions has been proved, you should answer the question "Yes." However, if you find
that any of these propositions has not been proved, then Rich County has not met the burden
of proof required and you should answer this question "No."

/f7srr
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INSTRUCTION NO. 25
By giving you instructions on the subject of damages, I do not express any opinion
as to whether Kyle Athay is entitled to damages.

INSTRUCTION NO. 26

If the jury decides Kyle Athay is entitled to recover from Rich County, the jury must
detem1ine the amount of money that will reasonably and fairly compensate Kyle Athay for
any damages proved to be proximately caused by the reckless disregard of Rich County's
agent Sheriff Dale Stacey.
The elements of damage the jury may consider are:
A. Non-economic damages
1.

The nature of the injuries;

2.

The physical and mental pain and suffering, past and future;

3.

The impairment of abilities to perform usual activities;

4.

The disfigurement caused by the injuries;

5.

The aggravation caused to any preexisting condition.

B. Economic damages

1.

The reasonable value of necessary medical care received and expenses

incurred as a result of the injury and the present cash value of medical care and expenses
reasonably certain and necessary to be required in the future;
2.

The reasonable value of the past earnings lost as a result of the injury;

3.

The present cash value of the future earning capacity lost because of the

injury, taking into consideration the earning power, age, health, life expectancy, mental and
physical abilities, habits, and disposition of Kyle Athay, and any other circumstances shown
by the evidence.
4.

The reasonable value of necessary services provided by another in doing

things for Kyle Athay, which, except for the injury, Kyle Athay would ordinarily have

Jti

performed and the present cash value of such services reasonably certain to be required in
the future;
Whether Kyle Athay has proved any of these elements is for the jury to decide.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 27
A person who has a pre,existing condition or disability is entitled to recover
damages for the aggravation of such preexisting condition, if any, that is proximately caused
by the occurrence.

The person is not entitled to recover damages for the pre-existing

condition or disability itself.
If you find that before the occurrence causing the injuries in this case Kyle Athay
had a preexisting bodily condition or disability, and further find that because of the new
occurrence in this case the pre-existing condition or disability was aggravated, then you
should consider the aggravation of the condition or disability in fixing the damages in this
case.

You should not consider any condition or disability that existed prior to the

occurrence, or any aggravation of such condition that was not caused or contributed to by
reason of this occurrence.
You are to apportion, if possible, between the condition or disability prior to this
occurrence and the condition or disability caused by this occurrence, and assess liability
accordingly. If no apportionment can reasonably be made by you, then Rich County, Utah
is liable for the entire damage.

r
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INSTRUCTION NO. 28
When I use the phrase "present cash value" as to any damage that may accrue in the
future, I mean that sum of money determined and paid now which, \vhen invested at a
reasonable rate of interest, would be sufficient to pay the future damages at the time and in
the amount the future damages will be incurred.
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INSTRUCTION NO. 29

A person who has been damaged must exercise ordinary care to lIlinhJJize the
damage and prevent further damage. Any loss that results from a failure to exercise such
care cannot be recovered.

Instr
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INSTRUCTION NO. 30
Under a standard table of mortality, the life expectancy of a male age 37 is 77 years.
This fignre is not conclusive. It is an actuarial estimate of the average probable remaining
length of life based upon statistical samples of death rates and ages at death in this country.
This data may be considered in connection with all other evidence relating to the probable
life expectancy, including the subject's occupation, health, habits, and other activities.

Inrtr

INSTRUCTION NO. 31
In this case, you will be given a special verdict form to use in returning your verdict.
This form consists of a series of questions that you are to answer. I will read the verdict
form to you now.
We, the Jury, answer the special interrogatories as follows:

Question No.1: Was Sheriff Dale Stacey's conduct on June 10, 1999 within in the scope
of his authority as an agent of Rich County, Utah?
Answer to Question No.1: Yes

No~

Question No.2: Did Sheriff Dale Stacey's conduct amount to reckless disregard, and if
so, was this reckless disregard a proximate cause of Kyle Athay's injuries?
Answer to Question No.2: Yes L l

No

If you answered "No," to either question 1 or 2 you are done. Sign the verdict as
instructed and advise the Bailiff. If you answered this question "Yes," continue to the
next question.

Question No. Was Kyle Athay negligent, and if so, was this negligence a proximate
cause of his own injuries?
Answer to Question No.3: Yes

[~

Nor~

Question No.4: Was Daryl Ervin negligent, and if so was his negligence a proximate
cause of the Kyle Athay's injuries?
Answer to Question No.4: Yes

~

Nor~

If you answered "Yes" to either or both of questions 3 and 4, answer Question No.5. If
you answered "No" to both Questions 3 and 4, then skip to Question No.6.

Instruction for Question No.5: You will reach this question if you have found that the
Sheriff Dale Stacey acted with reckless disregard and either or both Kyle Athay and
Daryl Ervin were negligent, which reckless disregard and negligence caused the injuries
to Kyle Athay. In this question, you are to apportion the fault between these parties in
terms of a percentage. As to each party or entity to which you answered "Yes" to
questions 2, 3, and 4, determine the percentage of fault for that party or entity, and enter
the percentage on the appropriate line. If you answered "No" to any of the above
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questions, insert a "0" or "Zero" as to that party or entity. Yom total percentages must
equal 100%.
Question No.
following:

\\That is the percentage of fault (if any) you assign to each of the

Sheriff Dale Stacey, agent of Rich County,
Kyle Athay
Daryl Ervin
Total must equal

%
%
%
100%

If the percentage of fault you assigned to the Kyle Athay is equal to or greater than the
percentage of fault you assigned to the Rich County, Utah, you are done. Sign the verdict
and advise the Bailiff. If the percentage of fault assigned to Kyle Athay is less than the
percentage of fault you assigned to Sheriff Dale Stacey, agent of Rich County, answer the
next question.
Question No.6: \\That is the total amount of damage sustained by the Kyle Athay as a
result of the accident?
Answer to Question
1.

6: We assess Kyle Athay's damages as follows:

Economic damages, as defined in the Instructions:

Non-economic damages, as defined in the Instructions:

Iq

INSTRUCTION NO. 32

In deciding iliis case, you may not delegate any of your decisions to anoilier or
decide any question by chance, such as by ilie flip of a coin or drawing of straws. If money
damages are to be awarded or percentages of fault are to be assigned, you may not agree in
advance to average the sum of each individual juror's estimate as the method of determining
the amount of the damage award or percentage of fault.

Jl1slr

INSTRUCTION NO. 33

On retiring to the jury room, select one of your number as a foreman, who \vill
preside over your deliberations.
An appropriate foml of verdict will be submitted to you with any instructions.
Follow the directions on the verdict form, and answer all of the questions required of you by
the instructions on the verdict form.
A verdict may be reached by three-fourths of your number, or nine of you. As soon
as nine or more of you shall have agreed upon each of the required questions in the verdict,
you should fill it out as instructed, and have it signed. It is not necessary that the same nine
agree on each question. If your verdict is unanimous, your foreman alone will sign it; but if
nine or more, but less than the entire jury, agree, then those so agreeing will sign the verdict.
As soon as you have completed and signed the verdicts, you will notify the bailiff,
who will then return you into open court.

INSTRUCTION NO. 34

I have given you the rules of law that apply to this case. I have instructed you
regarding matters that you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the facts. In
a few minutes counsel will present their closing arguments to you and then you v,rill retire to
the jury room for your deliberations.
Each of you has an equally important voice in the jury deliberations. Therefore, the
attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of the deliberations are important. At the
outset of deliberations, it is rarely productive for a juror to make an emphatic expression of
opinion on the case or to state how he or she intends to vote. When one does that at the
beginning, one's sense of pride may be aroused and there may be reluctance to change that
position, even if shown that it is -wrong. Remember that you are not partisans or advocates,
but you are judges. For you, a'> for me, there can be no triumph except in the ascertainment
and declaration of the truth.
Consult with one another.

Consider each other's Vlews.

Deliberate with the

objective of reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual
judgment. Each of you must decide this case for yourself; but you should do so only after a
discussion and consideration of the case with your fellow jurors.

INSTRUCTION NO. 35

If it becomes necessary during your deliberations to communicate 'With me, you may
send a note signed by one or more of you to the bailiff. You should not try to communicate
with me by any means other than such a note.
During your deliberations, you are not to reveal to anyone how the jury stands on
any of the questions before you, numerically or othervvise, unless requested to do so by me.

let

INSTRUCTION NO. 36

You have now completed your duties as jurors in this case and are discharged with
the sincere thanks of this Court. You may now discuss this case with the attorneys or with
anyone else. For your guidance, I instruct you that whether you talk to the attorneys, or to
anyone else, is entirely your own decision. It is proper for you to discuss this case, if you
want to, but you are not required to do so, and you may choose not to discuss the case with
anyone at all. If you choose to talk to someone about this case, you may tell them as much
or as little as you like about your deliberations or the facts that influenced your decisions. If
anyone persists in discussing the case over your objection, or becomes critical of your
service, either before or after any discussion has begun, you may report it to me.
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The jury must first determine that Sheriff Dale Stacey's conduct amounted to reckless
disregard; if the answer to that question is yes, then the jury must make a separate finding
that Sheriff Stacey's conduct, amounting to reckless disregard, was a proximate cause of
Kyle Athay's injuries.

I encourage you to continue to deliberate, continue to read the instructions, and review
the evidence. I would direct your attention to the admonishment of the Court contained in
instruction #34.

\

The Court would refer you back to jury instruction #33 and the language in the 3

rd

paragraph. In answering the specific question asked, there must be at least nine of you
agree on each question, before moving to the next question, if the Special Verdict r orm
requires you to do so. Each question answered, does not have to be answered by the same
nine or more jurors. Vv'hichever question is the last question on the form that you are
going to answer, the nine or more who agreed on that question are the nine who shall sign
the verdict form.

